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NOTES
Flying Carpets and the Warsaw Convention
Property Damage Limitation:
Saba v. Compagnie Nationale Air France
I. Introduction
After World War I, airplane designers and manufacturers made
steady advances in aeronautics, and by the late 1920s, airline
companies began to carry passengers across national borders.' In
1929, just two years after Charles Lindbergh successfully flew
across the Atlantic,2 delegates of thirty-three nations met in
Warsaw to establish ground rules for international air travel
Recognizing that international flight would beget a litter of
complex legal offspring,4 the delegates saw the need for an
updated legislative framework capable of handling these imminent
problems? The result of that conference was an international
I See Berner v. British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 219 F. Supp. 289,
322-23 n. 18 (1963); Lee Kreindler, I Av. ACCIDENT L. 342 (1963) (describing the
airline industry in 1929).
2 See Perry S. Bechky, Management and Misinterpretation: U.S. Judicial
Implementation of the Warsaw Convention in Air Disaster Litigation, 60 J. AIR L. &
COM. 455, 460 (1995).
3 See Francis Lyall, The Warsaw Convention-Cutting the Gordian Knot and the
1995 Intercarrier Agreement, 22 SYR. J. INT. L. 67, 69 (1996). The Warsaw Convention
was not the first gathering of its kind. In 1925, the French hosted the First International
Conference of Private Air Law, but no lasting treaty or agreement resulted. See David I.
Sheinfeld, From Warsaw to Tenerife: A Chronological Analysis of the Liability
Limitations Imposed Pursuant to the Warsaw Convention, 45 J. AIR L. & CoM. 653, 657
(1980).
4 For a sampling of some of the difficult legal questions arising out of
international air travel, see Bechky, supra note 2, at 460.
5 See Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United States and the
Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REv. 497, 498-99 (1967). The delegates felt a great
responsibility to modernize the law to keep pace with racing technology. The reporter
for the Preparatory Committee told the Warsaw Conference, "[W]hat the engineers have
done for machines, we must do for the law." Id. (citing II CONFERENCE INTERNATIONAL
DE DROIT PRIVE AERIEN, 4-12 OCTUBRE 1929, VARSOVIE 17 (1930) (Lowenfeld trans.
1966)).
632 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. 22
treaty known today as the Warsaw Convention.'
In drafting the treaty, two policy goals were particularly
important to Convention delegates.7 First, they wanted to create
uniformity and certainty in litigation arising out of international
flights.' Second, they hoped to facilitate international travel by
making it affordable-both to the fledgling airline companies and
to their passengers.9
In furtherance of these goals, the Convention capped damages
recoverable from airlines for harm occurring on international
flights. In wrongful death cases, airline liability was limited to
125,000 poincare francs, or about 8,300 dollars per person." For
property loss or damage, the Convention limited recovery to 250
poincare francs per kilogram, or about 9.07 dollars per pound of
damaged property. 1  The liability limits, however, were not
6 See Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted at 49
U.S.C. app. § 1502 note 1 (1994) [hereinafter Warsaw Convention]. The United States
did not formally participate in the drafting of the Convention, but ratified it in 1934
without substantive debate. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 5, at 502. For a
more comprehensive discussion of the historical background of the Warsaw Convention,
see id. at 498-502.
1 See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 5, at 498.
8 See id.
9 See id. at 498-99. For further discussion of the Convention's dual policy goals
see, e.g., Naneen K. Baden, The Japanese Initiative on the Warsaw Convention, 61 J.
AIR L. & COM. 437, 438 (1995) (stating that the Convention's goals "were to provide
uniform liability limits and to develop uniform procedures for dealing with
international" tort claims); Bechky, supra note 2, at 462 (arguing contrary to Lowenfeld
& Mendelsohn that the delegates' aim to establish a uniform system for aviation claims
was the more important of the two goals); Zachary Lawrence, Aviation Law: Attempts to
Circumvent the Limitation of Liability Imposed on Injured Passengers by the Warsaw
Convention, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 851, 851 (1978) (stating that the liability limit was
intended to "promote the rapid growth of international air travel.") (citing 1 L.
Kreindler, Av. ACCIDENT LAW, § 11.01 [2] (rev. ed. 1977)); Sheinfeld, supra note 3, at
656 (stating that the different legal systems involved in international air travel
necessitated the creation of uniform rules).
1o See Warsaw Convention, supra note 6, art. 22. The text reads:
(I) In the transportation of passengers the liability of the carrier for each
passenger shall be limited to the sum of 125,000 francs. Where, in accordance
with the law of the court to Which the case is submitted, damages may be
awarded in the form of periodical payments, the equivalent capital value of the
said payments shall not exceed 125,000 francs. Nevertheless, by special
contract, the carrier and the passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability.
Id.
" Id. The text reads:
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absolute. The Convention allowed traffickers of expensive goods
to preemptively avoid the damage cap by making a declaration of
"special value" to the carrier." This declaration set the damage cap
at the amount stated by the owner but had the negative effect of
making the owner liable for additional shipping charges
determined by the air carrier. 3  Moreover, the Convention
specifically provided that the caps would not apply if the
offending carrier were guilty of "willful misconduct" or its
equivalent.
14
The limitation amounts were considered modest in 1929,"5 and
embarrassingly so in subsequent years. 6 Persistent attempts by the
United States to raise the limit for personal injury cases have had
only marginal success." Today the property limitation remains
(2) In the transportation of checked baggage and of goods, the liability of the
carrier shall be limited to the sum of 250 francs per kilogram, unless the
consignor has made, at the time when the package was handed over. to the
carrier, a special declaration of the value at delivery and has paid a
supplementary sum if the case so requires.
Id.
12 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 6, art. 22(2).
' See id.
"4 Id. art. 25. The text reads:
(1) The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of this
convention which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his
willful misconduct or by such default on his part as, in accordance with the law
of the court to which the case is submitted, is considered to be the equivalent of
willful misconduct.
Id.
11 See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 5, at 499.
16 See Baden, supra note 9, at 439. For further discussion of U.S. discontent with
the Convention's low limits, see Eloise Cotugno, No Rescue in Sight for Warsaw
Plaintiffs from Either the Courts or Legislature-Montreal Protocol 3 Drowns in
Committee, 58 J. AIR. L. & COM. 745, 745 (1993) (citing Marc S. Moller, The Warsaw
Convention: A Continuing Dilemma For International Aviation, 63 LAW INST. J. 1040,
1041 (1989); Ernest F. Hollings, Defeat of the Montreal Protocols: Victory for Airline
Passengers, TRIAL, May 1983, at 20; Lee S. Kreindler, The Pan Am 103 Atrocity,
LLOYD'S AVIATION L., Mar. 15, 1989, at 1, 3) (noting that critics have called the
convention "heinous, absurd, archaic, outmoded, and outrageous").
17 In 1955, The Hague Convention met and doubled the liability limit to 16,600
dollars. See Lyall, supra note 3, at 72. Still unsatisfied, the U.S. threatened to denounce
the Convention in 1965. See id. at 73. Just days before it was to become effective, the
U.S. denunciation was averted by the Montreal Interim Agreement of 1966 which raised
the limit to 75,000 dollars. See id. The Interim Agreement was followed by further
failed attempts to boost the limit in 1971 (The Guatemala Protocol), 1975 (the Montreal
Protocols) and again in 1990 (Montreal Protocol 3). See id. at 74-76. The latest
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unaltered from its original expression. 8 In spite of the apparent
American disgust with the Convention, it still remains in force in
the United States, and is the treaty with the single greatest number
of international adherents. 9
Not surprisingly, international shippers of goods and attorneys
have attempted to skirt the Convention's limitations in a variety of
ways.2" The special declaration provided the surest avoidance of
the damages cap, but for whatever reasons--economic
considerations, ignorance, or sheer carelessness-not all owners of
goods made the declaration. The willful misconduct exception
continues to be a popular avenue for challenging the liability cap
because it is available to all owners whose property is damaged
regardless of prior declarations.21  One such case, Saba v.
Compagnie Nationale Air France,22 was decided recently by the
D.C. Circuit.
In Saba, Air France handled a large shipment of Persian
carpets for a man named Mohammed Ali Saba.23  Air France
transported the carpets from Austria to New York and later trucked
them to Virginia.24  There, the carpets were stored outdoors
because there was no room at the indoor storage facility.25 While
the carpets lay outside, heavy rains caused severe damage.26
That Air France was negligent in handling the carpets was not
proposals involve voluntary agreements by air carriers to raise the ceiling. See id. at 77-
78. For more comprehensive background on U.S. attempts to raise the liability limit, see
Cotugno, supra note 16, at 750-59; Baden, supra note 9, at 441-47; Lowenfeld &
Mendelsohn, supra note 5, at 501-601.
18 The property limit is still $9.07 per pound. See Saba v. Compagnie Nationale
Air France, 866 F. Supp. 588, 593 (D.D.C. 1994), rev'd 78 F.3d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
19 See Cotugno, supra note 16, at 745 (citing Lee S. Kriendler, Warsaw
Convention: An American Anachronism, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 30, 1988 at 3).
20 See Bechky, supra note 2, at 492.
21 In skirting the Warsaw Convention's limitations, plaintiffs have had the most
success with the willful misconduct exception. See Lawrence, supra note 9, at 861. The
willful misconduct exception is the most direct way to avoid the liability cap. See
Cotugno, supra note 16, at 772.
22 78 F.3d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
23 See id. at 665.
24 See id. at 666.
25 See id.
26 See id.
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at issue in Saba.z7  The real dispute concerned whether such
negligence rose to the level of willful misconduct.2" If it did, the
Warsaw Convention's liability limitation would not apply and Mr.
Saba would be able to recover his actual losses--the market value
of the carpets minus their salvage value.29 If the negligence was
found to be something less than willful misconduct, Air France's
liability would be limited by the Warsaw Convention to nine
dollars per pound of carpet.3°
Saba was the first case dealing with the Warsaw Convention's
property damage liability limit brought to the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals." In three prior cases, the court dealt with the
limitation as it applied to personal injury and wrongful death suits
in mass disaster cases.32 In each of those cases, the court found the
airlines guilty of willful misconduct, bringing the case outside the
liability limit.33
The Saba court, however, reached the opposite result on facts
34that were difficult to distinguish from the three disaster cases.
The court held that in order to prove willful misconduct on the part
of an airline, a plaintiff must show that the actor had subjective
27 See 78 F.3d 664, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
28 See id. at 667.
29 The carpets had a fair market value of $461,150 in an undamaged condition.
See Saba v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 66 F. Supp. 588, 592 (D.D.C. 1994),
rev'd 78 F.3d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Mr. Saba was able to sell the damaged carpets for
$182,200. See id. Mr. Saba sought to recover $278,950, the difference between the two
figures. See id.
30 See id. at 593. Neither the district court nor the circuit court mentioned the
exact weight of the damaged carpets, so it is impossible to determine the precise amount
Mr. Saba's recovery would have been reduced by the Warsaw Convention's damage
cap.
31 A D.C. district court did consider a property damage claim on one prior
occasion in Martin v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 135 (D.D.C.
1983). The court held that a baggage handler's refusal to see if a passenger's bag had
been properly tagged did not constitute willful misconduct within the meaning of the
Warsaw Convention. See id. at 138.
32 American Airlines v. Ulen, 186 F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1949); KLM Royal Dutch
Airlines Holland v. Tuller, 292 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1961); In re Korean Airlines
Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 932 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see discussion infra notes
110-37 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 110-37 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 148-86 and accompanying text.
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knowledge of the possible bad consequences of his actions.35 As a
practical matter, this new formulation of the rule may impose a
substantial burden on a plaintiff suing under the Warsaw
Convention because fulfilling the subjective test presents
difficulties of proof which are absent under an objective test.36
Most importantly, the willful misconduct standard articulated
in Saba will apply with equal force to both property damage and
personal injury cases. 3' Although Saba only deals explicitly with
the property damage provision, it will nonetheless affect all future
litigation involving Warsaw Convention liability caps. Wrongful
death plaintiffs and victims injured in air disasters alike will have
to meet Saba's more demanding terms-a result that in some ways
conflicts with D.C. Circuit precedent and common judicial
practice.38
This note will explore the facts and procedural history of Saba
in Part H."39 Part III will focus on the background law, giving
special attention to the three above-mentioned disaster cases.4
Part IV will analyze the court's opinion and its place relative to the
disaster precedent. 4' Finally, Part V of this note will conclude that
Saba provides only short-term results that offend the traditional
judicial treatment of the Warsaw Convention. 2  The note,
however, recognizes that in the long-term, Saba may encourage a
final legislative resolution to the low liability caps in the Warsaw
Convention. 3
35 See Saba, 78 F.3d at 668.
36 See infra notes 187-215 and accompanying text.
37 In terms of the application of the willful misconduct exception, the Warsaw
Convention makes no distinction between the two types of cases. See Warsaw
Convention, supra note 6, art. 25. Moreover, the Saba court treated prior air disaster
precedent as binding in deciding this property damage case. See Saba, 78 F.3d at 668.
The reverse should also be true.
31 See infra notes 148-86, 228-31 and accompanying text.
39 See infra notes 44-109 and accompanying text.
40 See infra notes 110-46 and accompanying text.
41 See infra notes 147-227 and accompanying text.
42 See infra notes 228-37 and accompanying text.
I See infra notes 238-40 and accompanying text.
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II. Facts and Procedural History
In 1990, Mohammed Ali Saba, a dealer of Persian rugs,
contracted with Air France for the transportation of 800 hand-
woven rugs from Austria to the United States.44 On September 19,
1990, Air France packaged the carpets in Austria and air-freighted
them to Kennedy International Airport in New York City.45  At
Kennedy Airport, Air France loaded the carpets on trucks for
transport to Dulles Airport in Virginia." At Dulles, Air France
stored the carpet with its U.S. cargo agent, DynAir.47 The carpets
were to be stored in DynAir's storage facility at the airport, but the
facility was full at the time." In accordance with its customary
practice in such cases, DynAir stored the carpets outside the
facility.49  DynAir employees put additional plastic over the
carpets and stored several of them in bins where they sat outside
for five days.5" On September 30, 1990, the day before Mr. Saba
was to pick up the carpets, a forecasted rainstorm hit Dulles,
dumping a third of an inch of rain on the carpets.5 The carpets
were not adequately protected and eighty-seven of them suffered
major damage.5
I See Saba v. Compagnie Nacionale Air France, 866 F. Supp. 588, 590 (D.D.C.
1994), rev'd, 78 F. 3d 644 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
45 See id.
46 See id.
47 See id. See also Dynair Profile, World Airport Week, Aug. 22, 1995, available
in Westlaw, 1995 WL 9125058. The article noted that DynAir
operates at more than 50 airports in the United States, providing services to
more than 150 customers, the majority of which are domestic and international
airlines. Some 64% of its customers are based in North America, 13% in
Europe and 12% in Latin America. DynAir's business covers general airport
services (including ground support and equipment maintenance, baggage
handling, aircraft cleaning, deicing, passenger ticketing and security); fueling
(including fuel farm management and fuel distribution); and cargo handling
(including design and operation of air freight hubs, cargo and mail,
documentation and customs clearance, and aircraft loading).
Id.
48 See Saba, 78 F. Supp. at 590.
41 See id.
50 See id.
II See id.
52 See id. at 592. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
1997] 637
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A. District Court
Mr. Saba brought suit against Air France in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia. In a non-jury trial, the
district court determined initially that the terms and requirements
of the Warsaw Convention governed the suit. 3 The court found,
however, that Air France's initial packaging of the carpets in
Austria and their subsequent shabby care at the Dulles airport rose
to the level of willful misconduct and, therefore, the liability
limitation in Article 25 did not apply.1
4
Central to the district court's reasoning was Air France's
disregard of its own detailed regulations while packing the carpets
in Austria.55 Although the regulations called for humidity-
sensitive cargo, such as carpets, to be stored in plastic containers,"
Air France put most of the carpets on non-enclosed shipping
pallets.57 Furthermore, the few containers that were used were not
water-tight. 8 While the regulations required a double covering to
be in place and mandated that the tops and sides of cargoes be
covered, Air France did neither. 9
The district court also found that Air France must answer for
the careless treatment of the carpets in Virginia.6' Even though Air
France effectively turned the carpets over to DynAir at the Dulles
Airport,61  the district court apparently imputed DynAir's
negligence to Air France because Dynair was Air France's agent.62
Thus, Air France was ultimately responsible for the failure of
53 See Saba v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 886 F. Supp. 588, 591 (D.D.C.
1994). "The Warsaw Convention applies to 'all international transportation of... goods
performed by aircraft for hire,' where 'according to the contract made by the parties, the
place of departure and the place of destination.., are situated... within the territories
of two High Contracting Parties."' Id. (quoting the Warsaw Convention, supra note 6,
art. 1 (1),(2).
54 See id. at 593.
15 See id. at 593-94.
56 See id. at 593.
51 See id. at 594.
58 See id.
59 See id.
60 See id.
61 See id.
62 See id.
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DynAir employees to shelter the carpets when the damaging rain
began to fall.63
The district court concluded that "through a series of acts, the
performance of which was intentional, Air France has
demonstrated reckless disregard 4 of the consequences of its
performance."'65 This finding brought the case outside the Warsaw
Convention limitation, allowing full recovery of actual damages.66
B. Circuit Court
Air France appealed the district court's decision.67 In a two-to-
one decision, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia reversed the district court, finding that the court had
erred by applying the wrong legal standard for willful
misconduct.
68
1. Majority Opinion
Writing for the majority, Judge Silberman recognized the
historic confusion in case law concerning the precise meaning of
"willful misconduct or its equivalent" for purposes of the Warsaw
Convention.69 He dedicated most of his opinion to a discussion of
willful misconduct as a legal standard and sought to clarify it.7"
The opinion essentially established two requirements for a finding
of willful misconduct. First, the evidence must show that the
63 See id. at 594. See also Saba v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 78 F.3d 664,
670 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The Saba circuit court also agreed that Air France would be liable
for DynAir's actions under principles of agency. See id. at 670 n. 6.
64 The Warsaw Convention's exception requires "willful misconduct" or its legal
equivalent. Warsaw Convention, supra note 6, art. 25. Reckless disregard has been held
to be the equivalent of "willful misconduct" for purposes of the Warsaw Convention.
See Saba, 78 F.3d 664, 667. The terms are used interchangeably throughout this note.
65 Saba, 866 F. Supp. at 594.
66 See id.
67 See Saba, 78 F.3d at 665.
68 See id. at 670. The court acknowledged that had the district court applied the
correct standard, its decision would be entitled to great deference under a "clearly
erroneous" standard of review; however, since the district court did not use the proper
legal standard, no deference was due. See id.
69 Id. at 667.
70 See id. at 666-67.
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defendant acted intentionally.7  Second, the evidence must
demonstrate that the defendant possessed subjective knowledge of
the risks inherent in his conduct.72
After reviewing the applicable case law, the majority stated
that historically the reckless disregard standard was meant to
provide "a proxy for willful misconduct's scienter requirement."73
In other words, the reckless disregard standard ensured that the
actor was "subjectively aware of the wrongfulness of his act. 7 4
This subjective awareness, the court held, conceptually
separated gross negligence from reckless disregard on a continuum
running from negligence to intent." Gross negligence, the court
explained, is simply "a palpable failure to meet the appropriate
standard of care."76 Reckless disregard, on the other hand, serves
as "a legitimate substitution for intent to do the proscribed
act. . . ."" The court pointed out that negligence was measured
against an objective or "reasonable person" standard, whereas for
reckless disregard the actual knowledge of the particular actor
must be considered.7" For example, the majority read the Warsaw
Convention to limit liability in cases "where a reasonable
employee should have but did not understand that her actions
posed a substantial risk of harm to a shipper's goods."7 9  The
majority's test, then, requires actual, subjective knowledge by an
actor that her actions would lead to some harm.s°
Recognizing the problems of proof such a subjective standard
entailed, the majority acknowledged that "the actor's intent may
be inferred from indirect evidence and the reckless nature of his
acts."'" Under the majority test, indirect evidence must be used to
71 See id. at 668.
72 See id.
73 See id. at 667.
74 Id. at 668.
75 See id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 See id. at 667.
79 Id. at 669-70.
80 See id. at 669.
81 Id. at 668 (quoting In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 704 F.
Supp. 1135, 1136 (D.D.C. 1988)).
640 [Vol. 22
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prove that "the danger was so obvious that the actor 'must have
been [subjectively] aware of it."'8 2 Objective facts and evidence
must therefore permit the inference not that the actor should have
recognized the danger, but that the actor did in fact know and
appreciate the risks of his conduct.83
The Saba majority held that the lower court had applied an
objective test with regard to "reckless indifference" and therefore
committed reversible error." Instead of looking to the actual,
subjective knowledge of Air France's employees, the district
court, in the majority's view, based its decision on what a
reasonable Air France employee would and should have done to
protect the carpets.85 Negligence cases might be satisfied under
such an objective test, but the majority held such an analysis
inadequate as a matter of law to show "reckless disregard."86
Applying its test to the facts on record, the majority noted that
no evidence showed that Air France's employees were
"subjectively aware of serious risks attending packaging the
carpets inadequately in violation of regulations.... " Evidence
that the employees had violated Air France's packaging
regulations was inadequate to give rise to the inference that the
employees actually comprehended the danger."
In closing, the majority suggested that the confusion about the
proper legal standard, willful misconduct, and the "tort liability
creep," stemmed from the natural tendency by judges and juries to
remedy obvious negligence. 9 . In the court's estimation, the district
court had indulged its sympathies by impermissibly lowering the
willful misconduct standard to allow Mr. Saba to slip by the
liability limitation.9° The court reasoned that such an "ex post"'"
82 Id. at 669 (quoting SEC v. Steadman, 967 F.2d 636, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1992))
(emphasis added) (alteration added).
83 See id.
See id. at 666-67, 670.
85 See id. at 670.
86 See id.
87 See id.
88 See id. at 670.
89 See id. at 671.
90 See id.
91 The dissent defines an "ex post" approach as one in which judges compensate
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approach to the Warsaw Convention violated the policies that
originally gave rise to the Convention: the "economics of air
travel" and the "overall welfare of passengers."92
2. Dissent
Judge Wald dissented, arguing that the district court had
applied the correct standard, but that even applying the majority's
standard, Mr. Saba should still have prevailed.93 She also disagreed
with the policy reasons underlying the majority opinion.94 Judge
Wald was more concerned about the effects of "creeping
unaccountability" on future passengers than "creeping tort
liability" on airlines.
Judge Wald first criticized the majority's subjective test
because it lacked precision.9 6 Her dissent, focusing on matters of
proof, noted the failure of the majority to clearly set forth what a
plaintiff must show to satisfy the subjective standard.97 According
to the n some places the majority "seem[ed] to suggest that a
plaintiff must prove a carrier had actual knowledge that its actions
posed a substantial risk of harm,"" while in other places
acknowledging that such an inference can be made by a jury on the
basis of objective facts.99
According to Judge Wald, such imprecision not only made the
standard confusing, it added nothing to the caselaw already in
place.' She read the majority's subjective rule as allowing a jury
to infer that an actor has subjective knowledge of the wrongfulness
of his actions when the actor "departs in an extreme fashion from
the standards of ordinary care. ' ' This, she contended, was no
plaintiffs "because their injuries arouse our sympathies ...... Id. at 677 (Wald, J.,
dissenting).
92 Id. at 671.
93 See id. at 675 (Wald, J., dissenting).
91 See id. at 677 (Wald, J., dissenting).
95 See id. (Wald, J., dissenting).
96 See id. at 671 (Wald, J., dissenting).
17 See id. at 672 (Wald, J., dissenting).
98 Id. (Wald, J., dissenting).
99 See id. (Wald, J., dissenting).
100 See id. at 674 (Wald, J., dissenting).
101 Id. at 673 (Wald, J., dissenting).
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different from the objective standard which permitted the jury to
make precisely the same inference.' °2 She intimated that in spite of
the majority's efforts to divorce the subjective test from the
objective test, the two tests were identical for practical purposes
because they were both based on quantitative, objectively
measurable departures from the objective standard of care.' 3 in
the end, both tests boiled down to "how badly a carrier must
behave before an inference of subjective knowledge of likely
disastrous consequences will be permitted."1°4
Taking the argument to its logical conclusion, the dissent
stated that because the majority's test added nothing to the test that
the district court applied, there could be no error in the district
court's use of the objective test.'0 5  In addition, the dissent
contended that if the test truly required subjective knowledge of
the actor, it conflicted with binding precedent in the circuit.0 6
Judge Wald then applied her reading of the majority's rule to
the facts in the case. She cited Air France's Aircraft Handling and
Loading Operational Regulations, a manual which gave specific
instructions for the treatment of water-sensitive cargo.' °7 Based on
the numerous departures from the manual's instructions, Judge
Wald concluded that the district court was warranted in making
two inferences: first, that the regulation violations were so
egregious that the Air France employees were undeniably aware of
the danger of leaving the carpets outside,"0 8 and second, that
storing carpets outdoors in such condition, despite forecasted rain,
constituted a breach of the ordinary standard of care "to warrant, if
not mandate, an inference that Dynair employees had to recognize
the substantial risk created by their actions."'" Thus, under either
an objective or subjective formulation of "reckless disregard," the
102 See id. (Wald, J., dissenting).
103 See id. at 675 (Wald, J., dissenting).
oS Id. (Wald, J., dissenting).
105 See id. (Wald, J., dissenting).
106 See id. at 673 (Wald, J., dissenting).
108 See id. at 675, 676 (Wald, J., dissenting).
118 See id. at 677 (Wald, J., dissenting).
109 Id. (Wald, J., dissenting). Dynair's actions were imputed to Air France under
agency principles. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
6431997]
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dissent argued that the district.court decided the case correctly.
III. Background Law
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has decided some of the
leading cases on the Warsaw Convention's liability limits. The
first of these, American Airlines v. Ulen,"' involved a 1945 plane
crash in Virginia."' One of the survivors of the crash brought a
tort suit against the airline."' The jury found that the airline was
guilty of willful misconduct primarily because the flight plan
called for the plane to fly at an altitude of 4000 feet past a
mountain 4080 feet in elevation."3 This was a clear violation of
Civil Air Regulations (CAR)," 4 and plain common sense."5 On
appeal, the circuit court upheld the trial court's instruction to the
jury as the appropriate standard for willful misconduct."6 The
instruction at issue read as follows:
Now, willful misconduct is not, as I have said, merely
misconduct, but willful misconduct. So if the carrier or its
employees or agents, willfully performed any act with the
knowledge that the performance of that act was likely to result
in injury to a passenger or performed that act with reckless and
wanton disregard of its probable consequences, then that, would
constitute willful misconduct. "
The court found that the defendant had violated the CAR
regulation with knowledge and had shown reckless and wanton
disregard for the consequences of that violation."' Therefore, the
court held that the jury was justified in finding willful misconduct
on the defendant's part.
110 186 F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
"' See id. at 530.
112 See id.
"i3 See id. at 534.
"4 Civil Air Regulations 61.7401, 8 Fed. Reg. 6589 (1943). The regulation reads
in part, "No scheduled air carrier aircraft shall be flown at an altitude of less than 1000
feet above the highest obstacle located within a horizontal distance of five miles from
the center of the course intended to be flown .... " Id.
I"I See Ulen, 185 F.2d at 532.
116 See id. at 533.
"7 Id.
118 See id. at 534.
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In KLM Royal Dutch Airlines Holland v. Tuller,"9 a flight from
Amsterdam to New York crashed into the ocean just after taking
off from an intermediate stop in Ireland.2' Due to lapses in
communication on the part of KLM's employees in the control
tower and in the downed plane, authorities were not immediately
aware of the crash.' In fact, rescue efforts did not begin for
nearly four hours.' Meanwhile, the decedent had exited the plane
and managed to climb onto the tail of the aircraft where he waited
for rescue.'23 Just as the rescue craft approached the scene, the
decedent lost his footing, slipped off the tail, and drowned.'24
The wrongful death action subsequently brought against the
airline alleged four instances of willful misconduct by KLM
employees: 2 ' 1) failure to notify the passengers of the existence,
location, and use of life vests; 2) failure on the flight crew's part to
broadcast an emergency message after the crash; 3) failure to
provide for the safety of the decedent after his danger was known;
and 4) failure of the KLM hierarchy to properly relay messages
concerning the loss of communication with the plane.'26 Applying
the standard for willful misconduct articulated in Ulen,"'27 the
circuit court held on review that the objective evidence presented
at trial could reasonably lead a jury to find willful misconduct in
each of the four categories.'28 The Warsaw Convention's liability
cap therefore did not apply.
In the most recent Warsaw Convention case in the D.C. circuit,
In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983,29 a Korean
airliner that strayed into Soviet airspace was shot down, killing all
119 292 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
120 See id. at 777.
121 See id.
122 See id.
123 See id.
124 See id. at 775.
125 See id. at 779.
126 Id.
127 See id. at 778.
121 See id. at 782.
129 932 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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of the passengers. 3 The facts about the flight were sketchy, and
theories about the disaster involved some guesswork. 3' The
plaintiffs in the suit hypothesized that the plane's Inertial
Navigation System (INS) was improperly programmed, sending
the flight off course.' According to the plaintiffs' theory, the
pilots of the plane must have known that they were well off
course, but decided to proceed rather than turn around. The
plaintiffs alleged that the flight crew knew they would probably
face disciplinary actions for negligently programming the INS,'33
and misrepresented their position during the flight to cover up the
mistake. '
The jury returned a verdict in the plaintiffs' favor, and the
circuit court did not disturb that determination.'35 The court
deferred to the jury's role as trier of fact because the facts were
few and ambiguous. 36 The opinion held that the plaintiffs'
scenario, if accepted by the jury as true, properly constituted
willful misconduct under the standard outlined in Tuller.'37
In addition to the Warsaw Convention precedent, the Saba
court looked to cases that construed the willful misconduct
concept in other situations. Primary among these cases was SEC
v. Steadman.' In Steadman, an investment adviser failed to
register certain mutual funds under the Blue Sky laws of the
various states where the funds traded.'39 In failing to do so, the
adviser had relied on a letter from an attorney stating that
registration was not necessary in each state. 4° After trading for
130 See id. at 1476.
"' See id. at 1479.
132 See id. at 1478. The INS "is a navigational device which stores preprogrammed
flight plans and displays data during the flight showing deviations from the designated
route." See id. at 1478.
133 See id.
134 See id. at 1478.
13" See id. at 1477.
136 See id. at 1481.
137 See id. at 1479-80. The jury could have reasonably believed plaintiff's theory.
See id.
138 967 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
139 See id. at 639.
140 See id.
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seventeen years, the SEC investigated the funds and concluded
that the failure to register gave rise to serious securities violations,
including fraud."'
The Steadman court held that in order to prove fraud, the SEC
would have to prove "intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."'4
The court recognized that extreme recklessness could satisfy the
intent requirement, but noted that such recklessness was "not
merely a heightened form of ordinary negligence.' '143 Holding that
Mr. Steadman's negligence did not amount to extreme
recklessness, the court stated that,
[s]ophisticated professionals like Steadman might be assumed
to have come across information (perhaps from competitors) at
some point during the 17 years of non-registration that should
have put them on notice that the opinion on which they relied
might be incorrect .... But the evidence does not permit a
finding that Steadman or any of the directors actually knew the
opinion was wrong or was reckless in relying on it.'"
The Steadman court understood the extreme recklessness test to
require scienter or a lesser form of intent. 45  The Saba court
focused on this analogy, arguing that the same analysis should
apply to reckless indifference in Warsaw Convention cases.' 4
141 See id. at 640.
142 Id. at 641.
143 SEC v. Steadman, 967 F.2d 636, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
144 Id. at 642 (emphasis added).
i45 See id. at 641. The court held that recklessness is "an extreme departure from
the standards of ordinary care, .... which presents a danger of misleading buyers or
sellers that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have
been aware of it." Id. (citing Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033,
1045 (7th. Cir. 1977)).
14 After reviewing this analogous precedent, the Saba court stated: "Similarly,
reckless disregard, in the Warsaw Convention context, requires a showing that the
defendant engaged in an act that is known to cause or to be likely to cause injury." Saba
v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 78 F.3d 664, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
, The Saba court also looked to other cases, notably Farmer, a case brought by a
prisoner against prison officials for deliberate mistreatment. Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S.
Ct. 1970 (1994). The Supreme Court held that "deliberate indifference" in the Eighth
Amendment context was equivalent to recklessness and that both standards embodied a
subjective component. Saba, 78 F.3d at 669 (citing Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1979-80).
The Court noted:
The civil law generally calls a person reckless who acts or (if the person has a
duty to act) fails to act in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is
1997]
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IV. Analysis
The Saba court faced the precarious task of dealing with the
nebulous and conflicting notions of reckless disregard in D.C. case
law. 147 Complete reconciliation of all the precedent, both Warsaw
Convention and non-Convention cases dealing with willful
misconduct, would have been practically impossible for the Saba
court because of the historic competition between the objective
and the subjective tests.
A. Relation to Precedent
Some precedent, Ulen and Tuller in particular, resisted
reconciliation with the subjective rule advanced in Saba.'48
Indeed, the Saba majority conceded that the misconduct in Ulen
probably didn't amount to much more than gross negligence. 49
But the majority held that the disjointed jurisprudence of the
willful misconduct standard showed only that willful misconduct
embodied a variety of concepts.IS
Specifically, the majority identified two competing strains of
willful misconduct."5 ' First, it admitted that willful misconduct
had been thought of as a linear extension of negligence-a severe
departure from an objective standard of care.152 Ulen and Tuller
either known or so obvious that it should be known .... The criminal law,
however, generally permits a finding of recklessness only when a person
disregards a risk of harm of which he is aware.
See Saba, 78 F.3d at 669, (citing Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1978-79). See also Prosser and
Keeton § 34, pp. 213-214; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965); R. Perkins
& R. Boyce, CRIMINAL LAW 850-851 (3d ed. 1982); J. Hall, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF
CRIMINAL LAW, 115-116, 120, 128 (2d. ed. 1960); American Law Institute, MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c), and Comment 3 (1985); but see Commonwealth v. Pierce,
138 Mass. 165, 175-178 (1884) (Holmes, J.) (adopting an objective approach to criminal
recklessness).
The Saba court adopted the subjective test in Farmer. The Saba majority held
that willful misconduct was akin to this criminal intent and, as such, it required a
showing of actual knowledge of risk. See Saba, 78 F.3d at 669. See also supra notes
73-80 and accompanying text.
147 See Saba, 78 F.3d at 667. The Saba majority conceded that "we have never
been very clear as to what we meant by reckless disregard." Id.
141 See infra notes 157-68 and accompanying text.
149 See Saba, 78 F.3d at 667.
Io See id. at 669.
'I See id. at 668-69.
152 See id. at 668.
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seem to fall into this category.' Second, willful misconduct was
often defined in terms of the actor's subjective mind-set.5 4
Steadman, Ernst, and arguably In re Korean Air Lines fit within
this conception of willful misconduct.' The majority opinion in
Saba appears to have definitively chosen the second definition of
willful misconduct for Warsaw Convention cases. 56
Saba cited Ulen as support for its subjective test, but the Ulen
court's analysis is difficult to reconcile with Saba's formulation.'
In Ulen, the circuit court upheld the trial court's finding of willful
misconduct even though the defendants testified that they did not
know the elevation of the mountain into which the pilot crashed.'
Moreover, the defendants showed that the same pilot who crashed
the plane had flown that same route on several prior occasions
without incident.5 9 Both of these facts cemented the pilot's
negligence, but they also suggest that the pilot was subjectively
unaware of the serious risks of his flight course.' 60
However, instead of disallowing a finding of willful
misconduct on the basis of the pilot's ignorance, the Ulen court
seized on that ignorance as further positive evidence of the pilot's
willful misconduct. 6' By doing so, the court seemed to sanction
the inference that if a regulation was knowingly violated, the actor
should have understood the danger and could be charged with
constructive knowledge of the risks of violation.
62
The Saba court squarely rejected this sort of inference for the
purposes of willful misconduct. 63 The court stated that negligence
may be inferred from such evidence, but not willful misconduct.
The only inference allowed by the Saba court was that "the danger
153 See infra notes 157-68 and accompanying text.
114 See Saba, 78 F.3d at 668.
115 See infra notes 169-86 and accompanying text.
156 See Saba, 78 F.3d at 669.
157 See infra notes 158-68 and accompanying text.
158 See American Airlines v. Ulen, 186 F.2d 529, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
159 See id.
160 See Saba v. Air France, 73 F.3d 664, 673 (Wald, J., dissenting).
161 See Ulen, 186 F.2d at 534.
162 See Saba, 78 F.3d at 669.
163 See id.
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[is] so obvious that 'the actor must have been aware of it. ' '9 64
Again, the distinction between the objective and subjective tests
seemed to rest on what the actor should have known rather than
what the actor did in fact know.1 65 Tuller presented precisely the
same problem. That court discussed at length the misconduct of
KLM's employees,1 66 but the opinion never suggested that the
actors actually understood the danger inherent in their actions.167
To the extent Tuller and Ulen allowed a finding of willful
misconduct without a showing of the defendant's subjective
knowledge, they are in tension with Saba's statement of the rule.'68
The Korean Air Lines case provided an insightful comparison.
In that case, the plaintiffs alleged that the pilots of the downed
airliner actually knew the risks of attending deviations into Soviet
air space.'69 The plaintiffs' experts first testified that the pilots
would have been aware of their trespass because the plane's
instruments were functional, aside from the INS system.'7° The
plaintiffs also introduced evidence of a 1978 incident in which
another KAL plane was shot down after straying off course over
the Soviet Union. 17' This incident, the plaintiffs alleged, was
discussed in later KAL training activities. 172 The court held that,
164 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting SEC v. Steadman, 67 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
165 See Saba, 78 F.3d at 669-70. See supra notes 69-88 and accompanying. text.
'6 See KLM Royal Dutch Airlines Holland v. Tuller, 292 F.2d 775, 779-82 (D.C.
Cir. 1961).
167 See Saba, 78 F.3d at 679 (Wald, J., dissenting). The Tuller court did hold that
"the jury could reasonably find that the failure to ... instruct passengers as to the
location and use of life vests was a conscious and willful omission to perform a positive
duty and constituted reckless disregard of the consequences." Tuller, 292 F.2d at 779.
Yet it is unclear whether that language means that the flight crew was subjectively aware
of the danger resulting from its omissions or whether it simply indicated a gross
deviation from the crew's objective duty of care.
168 See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
169 See In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 932 F.2d 1475, 1478 (D.C.
Cir. 1991).
170 See id. at 1481. Because the evidence recovered from the wreckage was
inconclusive, there was some question concerning whether the pilots actually knew of
their deviation. See id. The plaintiffs alleged that the pilots would have or should have
known of the deviation, while a report issued by the International Civil Aviation
Organization concluded that the flight crew probably would not have been aware of their
error. See id.
"I See id. at 1478.
172 See id.
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taken together, these two facts could have led a jury to infer that
the pilots knew they were off course and that they knew of the
dangers involved in that deviation.'73 This finding would satisfy
even the subjective test advanced in Saba. While the Korean Air
Lines court did uphold the jury's finding of willful misconduct, 4
it never explicitly held that the crew's actual, subjective
knowledge of the risks was crucial to that finding."'
In order to be consistent with the subjective test advanced by
the Saba majority, the flight crew in Korean Air Lines must have
known of their deviation. 176 Otherwise, the crew would have been
guilty of gross negligence at best."' The Saba majority argued that
the Korean Air Lines court relied on the fact that the pilots knew
or must have known that they were off course.7 The dissent
disagreed, stating that the Korean Air Lines opinion "at no point
suggested that such knowledge was necessary for a finding of
reckless disregard."'7 9  The dissent contended that the jury's
finding of willful misconduct may just as easily have been made
on the theory that the flight crew simply failed to adhere to the
applicable standard of care. 8 ' This argument was consistent with
the dissent's view of willful misconduct as an objective extension
of gross negligence, not as a substitute for scienter.''
So while it seemed clear that the evidence in Korean Air Lines
could have satisfied the Saba majority's test for willful
misconduct, it was less clear that such allegations of scienter were
'I See id. at 1480.
1"4 See id. at 1481.
'I See Saba, 78 F.3d at 674 (Wald, J., dissenting). The Tuller decision contained
similar ambiguities. See id. at 673-74 (Wald, J., dissenting); see also supra note 167.
176 See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
177 See Saba, 78 F.3d at 668. The Saba court held that "the critical analytical
division between the tort that can be made out through presentation of merely objective
evidence-without regard to defendant's state of mind cuts recklessness in half. One
meaning of recklessness, then, is simply a linear extension of gross negligence." Id.
The Saba majority went on to hold that this first meaning of recklessness--an extension
of negligence-would not satisfy its test for willful misconduct. See id.
178 See id. at 668.
179 Id. at 674 n. 5 (Wald, J., dissenting).
180 See id. (Wald, J., dissenting).
181 See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
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necessary to the holding.'82 The Korean Air Lines case was
indicative of the ambiguity and competition between the objective
and subjective approaches to the misconduct standard in the D.C.
Circuit.
In short, the majority attempted to end the controversy by
selecting the definition of willful misconduct that approximates
scienter 8s It did so without explicitly overturning cases like Ulen
and Tuller, which seemed to be based on an objective approach to
willful misconduct.'84 The Steadman and Farmer cases seemed to
support the majority's rule more strongly,'85 while In re Korean
Air Lines might be read as supporting either approach.'86 In any
event, the Saba decision did effectively end the debate in the D.C.
Circuit between the objective and the subjective tests. But what
the Saba court's subjective test meant in itself was another issue
altogether.
B. Burden on Plaintiff
After Saba, a plaintiff seeking to avoid the liability limitations
in the Warsaw Convention may face some added difficulties in
proving willful misconduct.'87 Before Saba, the D.C. Circuit gave
substantial weight to evidence showing that the defendant
knowingly violated some regulation. 8 The Saba decision offers
little deference to regulation violations standing alone.8 9 Under
the subjective test for willful misconduct, regulations played a
more limited role. 190
The Ulen court found the knowing violation of a regulation
which forbade flying within five miles of obstacles to be willful
misconduct.' 9' The Tuller court relied on the KLM operations
182 See Saba, 78 F.3d at 674 (Wald, J., dissenting).
183 See id. at 667-68.
184 See supra notes 157-68 and accompanying text.
185 See supra notes 138-46 and accompanying text.
186 See supra notes 169-82 and accompanying text.
187 See infra notes 190-217 and accompanying text.
188 See American Airlines v. Ulen, 186 F.2d 529, 531-32 (D.C. Cir. 1949); KLM v.
Tuller, 292 F.2d 775, 779-780 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
189 See Saba, 78 F.3d at 670.
190 See infra notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
191 See Ulen, 186 F.2d at 532; see also supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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manual, which required all crew members "to have a 'conscious
anticipation prior to takeoff of possible failure,' and to send a
distress message as soon as an emergency arose."' 92 The Tuller
court also cited the Irish Government's requirements that a
distressed plane notify the "appropriate authorities 'by the quickest
means available."" 93 The Saba district court cited a New York
case, Bank of Nova Scotia v. Pan American Airlines, 94 for the
proposition that willful misconduct was an appropriate finding
when the defendant breached its own regulations. 95 To a plaintiff,
therefore, evidence that the defendant knowingly violated a safety
regulation was valuable and might by itself lead to a finding of
willful misconduct. 96
The Saba rule seemed to diminish the weight of regulations as
evidence of willful misconduct. Even though Mr. Saba established
clear and knowing violations of Air France's regulations, the Saba
court held that this evidence alone was insufficient as a matter of
law to prove willful misconduct.' 97  The court tentatively
distinguished the packing regulations in Saba from those in Ulen
and Tuller because they were not safety regulations promulgated
for the protection of human life. 98 This was enough to distinguish
Saba, but the court added that even the violation of a safety
regulation was probably at best negligence per se. 9' While this
192 KLM Royal Dutch Airlines Holland v. Tuller, 292 F.2d 775, 779-780 (D.C. Cir.
1961).
193 Id. at 780. In Tuller, there was no regulation requiring the airline to notify
passengers of the availability and location of life preservers on that particular flight. See
id. at 779. The court found that the absence of a regulation will not excuse a defendant
from its reasonable duty of care. See id.
194 16 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,378 (S.D.N.Y 1981).
195 See Saba v. Air France, 866 F. Supp. 588, 593 (D.D.C. 1994). The majority
ignored this case altogether and the dissent cited it with only qualified favor. See id. at
673 n. 4 (Wald, J., dissenting). Such a rule was correct, in the dissent's view, only if the
violation "represent[ed] an extreme departure from the standard of care mandated by the
regulation." Id. (Wald, J., dissenting).
196 See Tuller, 292 F.2d at 778. The Tuller court further held that the "'deliberate
purpose not to discharge some duty necessary for safety' constituted willfull
misconduct. Id. (quoting American Airlines v. Ulen, 186 F.2d at 533). That duty was
closely allied with the express requirements of safety regulations. See id. at 778-79.
197 See id. at 670.
198 See id. at 670, n. 5.
199 See id.
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latter assertion was not binding, the message to future plaintiffs
was clear: no longer will evidence showing a regulatory violation
be legally sufficient, standing alone, to show willful misconduct.
In order to establish willful misconduct, the Saba court would
have required Mr. Saba to show that Air France was subjectively
aware of the serious risks of violating its own regulations.2°°
Specifically, the court noted that Mr. Saba had offered no evidence
that the packers knew that the carpets were "likely to be left
outside in inclement weather."' 0' 1 Additionally, the court noted that
no evidence was offered that Air France's employees "actually
expected rain, or knew that if it rained, the packaging provided by
Air France" would be insufficient to protect the carpets.2 °2
The Saba court apparently demanded some evidence which
was different in kind from the objective evidence presented by Mr.
Saba--some direct evidence which would open a peep hole into
the defendants' minds.2"3 But as a practical matter, this sort of
direct evidence tending to show the defendants' actual knowledge
may be difficult to discover, because such evidence may be in the
sole possession of the defendants,2 4 or destroyed altogether.2 5
In many cases, therefore, plaintiffs may still have to rely on
objective evidence-measurable departures from a standard of
200 See id. at 670.
201 Id.
202 See Saba, 78 F.3d at 670.
203 See id. at 668.
204 The majority expressed concern that an objective test would allow defendants to
ignore the consequences of their actions. See id. at 668. But the subjective test may also
give rise to that danger. Defendants can claim ignorance of the consequences of their
clear negligence and the heavy burden will fall to the plaintiff to prove otherwise.
Moreover, the majority's subjective test creates difficulties in cases of vicarious liability
such as Saba. The principal, in this case Air France, may hide behind the misconduct of
its agent, Dynair, claiming ignorance of any negligence perpetrated by the agent. This
creates a problem of proof for a plaintiff, who must prove that the principal had
subjective awareness of the dangerous actions of its agent. This may cause inequity
especially in cases where the agent is insolvent or judgment proof and the plaintiff has
no alternative but to sue the principal. See id. at 677 (Wald, J., dissenting).
205 See In re Korean Air Lines, 932 F.2d 1475, 1478. The court noted that the
"flight recorders and most of the wreckage were never recovered, so the details of what
happened remain a mystery." Id. In most air disaster cases where all the persons aboard
a plane are killed, no one will have access to the pilot's subjective knowledge. See
Cotugno, supra note 16, at 775. Cotugno used this fact to argue for an objective test for
willful misconduct instead of a subjective one. See id.
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care--to prove willful misconduct. 6 Mr. Saba did precisely that.
He presented evidence of Air France's customary practice of
leaving excess cargo outside the storage facility.207 He showed that
the ruinous rains were publicly forecasted.2 8 Coupled with Air
France's blatant disregard of its own safety statutes, this evidence
could arguably lead to an inference that Air France did in fact
know the dangers of their actions.2 9
The Saba court found that this evidenced nothing more than
negligence on Air France's part.210 Yet the court recognized that at
some point such negligence could rise to a level where an
inference of actual knowledge of risks would be proper. t ' This
being so, the Saba dissent argued that the difference between the
objective test and the Saba majority's subjective test all but
evaporated.2 "2  The dissent would have thus collapsed the
majority's subjective test into an objective one."' But even if the
dissent was correct in asserting that the subjective test is objective
in form, the two tests are still quantitatively different.14 By the
dissent's own admission, the subjective test would be the more
burdensome in terms of the quantum of proof a plaintiff must
produce. 5
C. Policy Considerations
The Saba decision reaffirmed the two major policy goals of the
Warsaw Convention-economics of air travel and uniformity. 6
But nearly 70 years after the Convention's birth, scholars and
206 See Saba, 78 F.3d at 669.
207 See Saba v. Air France, 866 F. Supp. 588, 594 (D.D.C 1992).
208 See Saba, 78 F.3d at 666.
209 See id. at 675 (Wald, J., dissenting).
210 See id. at 670.
211 The majority wrote: "Intent can, of course, always be proved through
circumstantial evidence," and "the actor's intent may be inferred from indirect evidence
and the reckless nature of his acts." Saba, 78 F.3d at 668, 669 (citing In re Korean Air
Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 704 F. Supp. 1135, 1136 (D.D.C. 1988)).
212 See Saba, 78 F.3d at 675 (Wald, J., dissenting).
213 See id. (Wald, J., dissenting).
214 See id. (Wald, J., dissenting).
211 See id. (Wald, J., dissenting).
216 See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
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courts question whether those goals are deserving of continued
deference.
The Convention gave protection to tiny air companies still in
their economic infancy. Tort suits and high insurance costs might
have easily sent the new companies into unprofitable tailspins."7
But today, airline companies are generally not threatened with
extinction as the result of one or even multiple tort judgments
against them.28  Furthermore, air travel has become increasingly
safe, sending insurance prices down."9 The economic reasons for
the Convention's limitations, the argument goes, are therefore
outdated.22 Why airlines should be shielded while other large
corporations go about their business exposed to full liability seems
incongruous to critics in light of modem airline business.22'
Critics have likewise pointed out the Convention's failure to
establish any meaningful uniformity in international tort suits. 22
217 See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 5, at 499.
218 See Bechky, supra note 2, at 499.
219 In 1955, the International Civil Aviation Organization met to discuss the
possibility of amending the Warsaw Convention's liability limits. See Baden, supra
note 9, at 442. Since 1929, experience and data had been collected on air carrier safety.
It was determined that the airliners were much safer than previously thought. Fewer
airline crashes meant fewer tort suits and lower insurance costs to the airlines. Delegates
pointed to these factors to suggest that the liability limitation was no longer warranted.
See id. (citing ICAO Legal Committee, Report On the Revision of the Warsaw
Convention, ICAO International Conference on Private Air Law, vol. 2 at 96, ICAO
Doc. 7686-LC/140 (1956)). Today, airlines are safer than ever and can typically afford
to buy as much as 1.5 billion dollars in insurance for any one accident. See Symposium,
The Japanese Initiative: Absolute Unlimited Liability in International Air Travel, 60 J.
AIR. L. & COM. 819, 825 (1995).
220 See Bechky, supra note 2, at 499.
221 One critic of the economic justification for the Warsaw Convention has written:
Every commercial venture that sells a product or provides a service must bear
the cost of insurance for the benefit of the public. That is as much of a cost of
doing business as rent or salaries. No other business enjoys the liability
limitations of the Warsaw Convention. Airplane manufacturers have managed
to thrive without the benefit of this limitation, in spite of some enormous
judgments against them in recent years.
Lawrence, supra note 9, at 864. For further discussion of the economic policies behind
the Convention's liability limits, see, e.g., Bechky, supra note 2, at 499 (reviewing the
judge's economic arguments against the Convention.); Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra
note 5, at 504 (noting that by the 1950s, some people argued that there was no longer
any reason to afford special protection to the airlines).
222 See Baden, supra note 9, at 465-66; Bechky, supra note 2, at 467-68. Bechky
notes that the piecemeal solutions to the Warsaw Convention, such as the Montreal
protocol, have arguably defeated the uniformity goal. See id. He also recognizes the
1997] WARSAW CONVENTION DAMAGE LIMITATION
They note that even the liability limitations have created little, if
any, certainty in international litigation because of the
dissimilarities in local rules of procedure and tort law.223 The
Warsaw Convention itself allows each court to administer the
willful misconduct exception in accordance with its own rules
rather than some uniform standard.
224
Other critics, including Judge Wald, question the theory that
the Convention's limitations serve the overall welfare of the
passengers. Judge Wald noted that airline companies hardly feel
the sting of their neglect, especially in property damage cases.225
No matter what the worth of the property harmed, an airline
company will pay the same $9.07 per pound in damages, which
might actually discourage proper care of freight.2 6 While market
forces encourage general care of property, the occasional neglect
which can cause severe damage to particular passengers or clients
passes undercompensated.227
D. Judicial Remedy
Decades of legislative and executive effort have been unable to
bring about a more equitable liability cap.228 Where the other
difficulty of achieving uniform results internationally because foreign countries as well
as United States federal courts are at some liberty to interpret the terms of the
Convention as they see fit. See id. at 472. To remedy the situation, he advocates the
creation of a "shadow" court which would bear Warsaw Convention cases only. See id.
at 526. See also James D. Maclntyre, Where Are You Going? Destination, Jurisdiction,
and the Warsaw Convention: Does Passenger Intent Enter the Analysis? 60 J. AiR L. &
COM. 657, 669-693 (arguing that the Warsaw Convention has failed to create absolute
uniformity "with respect to the treatment given jurisdictional questions arising under the
Convention").
223 See id.
224 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 6, art. 25; but see Bechky, supra note 2, at
485. Bechky notes that the United States achieved some uniformity in Warsaw
Convention cases through the Multidistrict Litigation Act. See id.; see also 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1407 (1993). The Act authorizes a judicial panel to "consolidate separate claims
involving similar questions of law or fact before a single district court of its choosing."
Bechky, supra note 2, at 485, 486.
225 See Saba, 78 F.3d at 674 (Wald, J., dissenting).
226 See id. (Wald, J., dissenting). In a domestic context, liability limitations have
been rejected on the premise that the airlines will take better care of property absent any
liability cap. See Eugene Wesley Albert, Limitations on Air Carrier Liability: An
Inadvertent Return to Common Law Principles, 48 J. AIR L. & COM. 111, 130 (1982).
227 See Saba, 78 F.3d at 674 (Wald, J., dissenting).
228 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. Some commentators have opposed
the view that the liability caps are inequitable. See, e.g., Sir William Hildred, Air
657
658 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. 22
branches have failed, the judicial branch has often intervened to
permit fuller compensation.12 9  At times, courts have explicitly
denounced the policies behind the liability caps and allowed
unlimited recovery. 3° More often, however, courts have simply
read the exceptions to the liability limits expansively. By setting a
low threshold for "willful misconduct," for example, courts have
allowed plaintiffs to skirt the limits without explicitly slighting the
terms of the Convention.'
The Saba court was at stark odds with this widespread judicial
remedy-making. It denounced this ex post approach to the
Convention as contributing to the "tort liability creep" of this
century.3 The Saba majority was careful, however, not to suggest
that it believed the policy reasons behind the Convention still
made sense. The opinion noted: "the signatories [of the Warsaw
Convention] obviously thought that the economics of air travel,
and therefore the overall welfare of the passengers, dictated those
Carriers' Liability: Significance of the Warsaw Convention and Events Leading Up to
the Montreal Agreement, 33 J. AIR L. & COM. 521 (1967); G.I. Whitehead, Still Another
View of the Warsaw Convention, 33 J. AIR L. & CoM. 651 (1967).
229 The Warsaw Convention fixes damages so low that "[A]merican judges
understandably are tempted to use their equitable powers to circumvent the damage
cap." Bechky, supra note 2, at 493. Bechky further argues that many judges have in fact
yielded to this temptation "even when this required forcing a square peg into a round
hole, or drilling a new hole in the [Warsaw] Convention." Id.; see also Albert, supra
note 226, at 141 (stating that the reluctance of American courts to enforce the liability
provisions of the Convention without notice to the passenger represents a general
judicial policy against all such liability limitations).
230 See Bechky, supra note 2, at 499; see also Ray B. Jeffrey, The Growth of
American Judicial Hostility Towards the Liability Limitations of the Warsaw
Convention, 48 J. AIR L. & COM. 805, 806 (1983) (noting that the courts, "although
bound by the treaty, have avoided enforcing its limitations whenever possible."). See,
e.g., Reed v. Wiser, 414 F. Supp. 863, 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd 555 F.2d 1079, 1092
(2d Cir. 1977) cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977); In re Air Crash in Bali, Indonesia, 462
F. Supp. 1114, 1124-26 (C.D. Ca. 1978), rev'd 684 F.2d 1301, 1308 (9th Cir. 1982). In
these cases, the respective judges evaluated the policy reasons behind the Warsaw
Convention and finding them no longer of force, the judges ignored the liability caps.
231 Bechky noted that American courts have generally interpreted willful
misconduct as something akin to gross negligence. See Bechky, supra note 2, at 501-
504. He argued that the French concept of "dol," the word used in the original French
text of the Convention, implied much more than gross negligence. He wrote that he
would interpret "dol," as the Saba court did, as requiring subjective intent to do harm.
See id. The willful misconduct exception "provides the greatest latitude to avoid the
limitations of liability embodied in the Warsaw Convention." Lawrence, supra note 9,
at 862.
232 See Saba, 78 F.3d at 671.
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limitations." '233 The court essentially ignored the policy criticisms
altogether, deferring to the goals as stated by the Convention's
delegates.
The reasonable inference to be drawn from this portion of the
majority opinion is that any alteration of the Convention is to be
made by treaty or legislation, not by judges. The majority
interpreted its judicial function narrowly, spuming the activist
spirit that has led, in its opinion, to ill-founded judgments based on
sympathy rather than the terms of the Convention. In doing so, the
majority effectively washed its hands of the policy debate, and left
to higher powers the responsibility of redressing any inequities
that stemmed from a strict interpretation of the Warsaw
Convention.
23 4
The Saba dissent suggested that the majority treated this
property damage case differently than a personal injury case.235 In
a case where the equities on the plaintiffs' side were admittedly
weak by Warsaw Convention standards, the dissent accused the
majority of seizing the moment to cut back on precedent when
233 Id. (emphasis added).
234 The view expressed by Bechky is in substantial accordance with the Saba
majority view. See Bechky, supra note 2, at 499-500. After noting the Convention's
status as duly enacted law, he states:
Since Lyndon Johnson withdrew his denunciation of the Convention in 1966,
six successive Presidents have declined to exercise their power to denounce the
Convention again. Congress has never passed legislation to prevent the
Convention's domestic enforcement. Therefore, whatever a judge may think
about the policies underlying the... Convention, it remains the law and the
judge must enforce it.
Id. at 500.; but see Jeffrey, supra note 230, at 830-34. Jeffrey acknowledged the historic
tendency of the judiciary to let plaintiffs slip by the liability limitations and questioned
the propriety of such action. See id. But, he continued:
In defense of judicial activism towards the Convention, the equitable function
of the courts is an important consideration. American tort law is designed to
provide full and adequate compensation to injured plaintiffs by imposing the
cost of damages on the responsible parties. The courts strive to administer this
compensatory system, but they are frustrated in those cases in which the
Convention imposes its low ceiling on liability .... Although the courts are
not empowered to redraft the Convention as they see fit, they should not be
faulted for their reluctance to enforce the treaty at the expense of fairness and
justice.
Id. at 832-33. Some scholars take the view, contrary to Bechky, that the Warsaw
Convention is private, rather than public international law. As such, it can be amended
and altered unilaterally by the United States. See Symposium, supra note 219, at 826.
235 See Saba, 78 F.3d at 667 (Wald, J., dissenting).
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public outcry would be minimal.236 The dissent implied that had
Saba been a major air disaster case involving loss of life, the
majority would not have been so quick to deny compensation
through its strict subjective test.237
V. Conclusion
Whether guilty of opportunism or not, the Saba majority
affected the future of wrongful death cases as well as property
damage cases. The holding sets the standard for future cases
brought under the willful misconduct exception of the Warsaw
Convention. Thus, even when the inequities worked by the
Warsaw Convention are blatant, as in wrongful death cases, that
inequity should not affect the outcome of the case in any way
under the majority rule in Saba.238 This may have the effect of
creating more uniformity in Warsaw Convention cases in the D.C.
Circuit, but it will certainly not make the Warsaw Convention any
more popular to plaintiffs and scholars.
Despite its efforts, the Saba court may not have constricted the
willful misconduct escape route to the extent attempted. While the
majority purported to raise the standard for willful misconduct and
slow the tort liability creep, the subjective test advanced in the
opinion may still be vulnerable to ex parte decision making. The
imprecision inherent in a test that seeks to determine subjective
knowledge may allow judges to act on their sympathies in close
cases of willful misconduct.
239
If the subjective test retains such flexibility, the nagging
question--"Did the Saba court really change anything?"--surfaces
236 See id. (Wald, J., dissenting).
237 See id. (Wald, J., dissenting).
238 See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
239 The willful misconduct exception has traditionally been a flexible one, malleable
to fit the facts of the case at bar. As such, it is the most susceptible of creative work by
plaintiff's attorneys .... Lawrence, supra note 9, at 862. The Saba test will probably
not strip the exception of all its amorphous qualities. For example, if the Saba district
court had applied the majority test to the facts, it may reasonably have found that the
dangers attending the severe violations of Air France's regulations were so obvious as to
warrant an inference of actual knowledge of those risks. If the district court had simply
couched its opinion in those terms, its holding would probably not have been clearly
erroneous so as to require reversal on appeal. Indeed, the Saba dissent argued that even
applying the majority test, the facts of Saba constituted willful misconduct. See Saba,
78 F.3d at 675 (Wald, J., dissenting).
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again. Plaintiffs now have notice of the subjective rule and may
find ways of proving willful misconduct by simply adjusting their
evidence. Only time and future cases will tell just how much of an
additional hurdle Saba poses for victims of airline misconduct in
the District of Columbia. Based on the nebulous nature of the test
and the strong dislike for the limitations of the Warsaw
Convention, it will probably not tighten the willful misconduct
standard as much as the Saba majority would like.
Regardless of motive, the majority has affected the outcome of
property damage and disaster cases. While the decision
admittedly left one carpet dealer without an adequate remedy, the
Saba decision may ultimately lead to more equitable
compensation. If all courts were to adopt and strictly apply the
subjective test in Saba, more recoveries would likely be capped. If
more plaintiffs, including those family members of passengers
killed in high-profile air disasters, were sent away from American
courts with $75,000 before attorneys' fees, the Warsaw
Convention would become an American dinner table issue. This
might in turn increase scholarly and popular pressure for a lasting
legislative or executive agreement to either update the Warsaw
Convention or eliminate it altogether.24 Perhaps past judicial
leniency in Warsaw Convention cases is one of the reasons such
decisive action has not yet occurred.
BEN BROOKS
240 There are numerous advocates of both solutions. See generally Symposium,
supra note 219.

